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In a recent brochure entitled "Shakespear's Law," Sir George Grewood, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-law, reviews this interesting topic
with much legal acumen and, what is better, with equally sound common
sense. In a Foreword he merrily flays the solemn editor of "a certain Legal
Magazine" who had the impertinence, -on the rejection of the manuscript of
this little book. to lecture the author, this "septuagenarian member of his
profession," on his knowledge of the law. The editor apparently deserves
all that he gets. And in a final note Sir George repeats an insinuation apropos
of what he finds a change in the attitude of critics as to Shakespeare's technical knowledge of the law, an insinuation suggested likewise many years
ago by one V. A. R. in The Albany Law Journal, January 16, 1875. (See
Furness, Variorum "Merchant of Venice," p. 409.) This insinuation suggests that the denial of Shakespeare's knowledge of the law may be part
of the defence of Shakespeare's authorship of his plays and is levelled notably against their assignment to Bat:on. As, however, Sir George is avowedly
not a Baconian, although the author of a well-known and popular book
impugning Shakespeare's authorship of the Shakespearean plays, this matter
is happily not really before us. It is fair to say that the body of this discourse might have been written by the most orthodox of "Stratfordiansi" to
use for the nonce a detestable word derisively employed as to those who
still spend pleasant hours in company with these plays unhaunted by "historic" or other doubts as to who may or may not have written them.
Sir George begins with an account of Lord Campbells famous book,
"Shakespeare's Legal Acquirements," it,which the learned Lord Chancellor
contended that Shakespeare was possessed of "a deep technical knowledge
of the law" together with "an easy familiarity with some of the most
abstruse proceedings of English jurisprudence." This was in 1859; and it
seems not unlikely that his Lordship was considerably indebted to a smaller
work by Mr. William Lowes Rushton, barrister of Gray's Inn, entitled
"Shakespeare as a Lawyer," which had appeared in the previous year. Rushton's attitude of admiratiqn for the accuracy of Shakespeare's legal knowledge was much that of Lord Campbell, howsoever his Lordship omitted the
acknowledgment of any indebtedness to his predecessor. This matter of
precedence is of little importance now. Subsequently Rushton published
two other little works on this topic: "Shakespeare's Testamentary Language"
(1869), and "Shakespeare's Legal Maxims" (i9o7); we can agree with Sir
George Greenwood that both are worthy of study. Rushton makes a nice
point when he reminds readers that even Lord Campbell is guilty of some
slips in the law; therefore why condemn Shakespeare, who at least was not
a Lord Chancellor?
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Continuing his discourse, Sir George reminds us that as far back as
1821 Malone, one of the ablest of all Shakespeare critics, had pronounced
-. has the apthat the poet's "knowledge and application of legal terms .
pearance of technical skill"; whilst our own eminent American Shakespear-

can, Richard Grant White, like Malone, a lawyer, declared that "legal
phrases flow from Shakespeare's pen as part of his vocabulary and parcel
of his thoughts." Other witnesses are called, legal and lay; among them,
the distinguished editor of Shakespeare, George Steevens. his bibliographers,
the Cowden Clarkes, Mr. E. T. Castle, K. C., Professor Churton Collins and
the Baconians, Lord Penzance, judge Webb and judge Holmes, of the Supreme Court of the United States. Though these latter, as interested witnesses, may perhaps be better ruled out of court.
A neat turning point*is now found by the author in the change of view
as to Shakespeare's legal accuracy in a pleasing citation of Sir Sidney Lee's
'Life of William Shakespeare," edition of 1899. and of the same book as
revised in i915. In the earlier edition Sir Sidney simply followed earlier
tradition, accepting "Shakespeare's accurate use of legal terms" without further question. In the latter, "the poets legal knowledge" becomes ". mingled
skein of accuracy and inaccuracy, and the errors are far too numerous and
important to justify on sober inquiry the plea of technical experience." It
is perhaps pertinent to interpolate here that Sir Sidney Lee's "Life of Shakespeare" was a good piece of biographical gathering, as first published, which
has been spoiled by the overlaying of additional information as it has subsequently arisen at the expense of form and sometimes of consistency. Sir
George certainly seems to have put his finger on a case in point; and. a
footnote of Sir Sidney's referring to a book by Charles Allen, of Boston,
"Notes on the Bacon-Shakespeare Question," ixoo, makes clear to us, it
would seem, why Sir Sidney developed skepticism as to- Shakespeare's legal
knowledge. The sixth chapter of Allen's book is entitled ."Bad Law in
Shakespeare." It is made up of a series of objections to the use of certain legal terms, certain legal procedures and other like matters, so far as I
can personally see, largely on the basis that these things do not comport with
our contemporary definitions, our present. practices and our American--or at
least English-statutes of today. For example Mr. Allen objects to the
sworn agreement of the young courtiers with their king in "Love's Labour's
L~ost,"
"To keep those sta1tucs
That are recorded in this schedule here,"
because "a statute," he informs us, "imports a legislative act," and there
was none such here. Apparently he is unaware of the familiar "Statutes
Merchant" "Statutes Staple," in which the world equals rule or regulation,
as Sir George happily reminds him. Again, Mr. Allen comments seriously
on the provision of the will of Portia's father by which each suitor submits to
the test of the caskeis, and failing, must renounce wedlock. "This testamentary prohibition in restraint of marriage, with no means of enforcing it,
would seem to have been the invention of a story teller rather than a
lawyer," comments Mr. Allen. Precisely. And still again he quite as
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solemnly suggests that" conduct such as Portia's in impersonating Doctor
Belario "if it were possible under our system, would be good ground of
disbarment here." to any lawyer. we may assume, a party to it. Apparently
they take these matters quite seriously in Boston.
It would he absurd to take up the demolition of objections of this captious and unimaginative kind, did we not keep before us. as does Sir
George very pertintently, that the foremost contemporary biographer of
Shakespeare has been actually misled by such stuff into the statement: "No
judicious reader of 'The Merchant of Venice' or 'Measure for Mfeasure' can
fail to detect a radical unsoundness in Shakespeare's interpretation alike of
elementary legal principles and of legal procedure."
Besides the trifles mentioned above and the more important matters involved in the two plays just named, Sir George discusses several other
points raised by Allen and others before him, meeting the issue in some
cases, avoiding it in others; for he plainly constitutes himself as of counsel
for the defence throughout his pamphlet, howsoever he confesses in the
end, ad Iuc sub judicc Us cit. In "Richard III," Queen Elizabeth (Woodville) asks
"Tell me, what state, what dignity, what honor
Canst thou dczqsc to any child of mine,
precisely as Celia in "As You Like It," speaking of her father to Rosalind.
her cousin, says: "And truly, when he dies, thou shalt be hIs heir." Now
neither "demise" nor "heir" is employed correctly and technically in either
of these passages, obviously and simply because there is no reason on earth
-out of the mind of an unimaginative pettifogger-why they should be so
employed., Neither Celia in the Forest of Arden nor the queen of Edward
IV may be supposed by the wildest flights of the imagination to have been
learned in the law. These and many similar cases in Shakespeare of careless colloquialisms, where such is the veritable utterance of every-day life,
may be set down to the dramatic instinct of the poet. They have no reference whatever to "good law" or "bad."
Another group of Shakespearean examples of law and legal procedures
is referable to the poet's sources. One of the peculiarly English traits of
Shakespeare is the manner in which he uses his materials. As a dramatist
he unerringly rejects whatever will destroy his dramatic purpose, correspondingly retaining every stroke which will tell. This is obvious. But his
conservatism lies in his retaining, by reason of a certain faithfulness characteristic of him, many details in the old stories from which he derives his
plays. which neither tell for nor against the dramatic effect.
Thus Shakespeare found a wager which we should consider as grossly
contra bonos mores today, in Boccaccio's "Decameron," his source for
"Cymbeline," a wager which in modern England would never be enforced
by law and which upon this basis it would be absurd to have drawn up by
legal covenants. But the law of this play is not even the law of Boccaccio's
late medieval Italy; it is the law of the mythical realm of Cymbeline, King
of Great Britain when Augustus reigned in Rome; and argument as to
Shakespeare's knowledge or ignorance of what the English practice of his
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(lay might have been-to say nothing of contemporary lawv in .Massachusettsis preposterously irrelevant.
It has been said that the history of Shakespeare criticism consists largely
in one triumph after another of the poet over the ignorance of his commentators. Take for example Queen Katharine's words to Cardinal Wolsey
in .Henry VIII :
"I do believe,
Induced by potent circumstances, that
You are my enemy, and make my challenge.
You shall not be my judge,"
Mr. Devecmon, of the Maryland bar, we are informed, objects to this
because, under our common law, it is the juror alone, and not the judge, who
is subject -to challenge. But in the Variorum "Merchant of Venice" (p.
417) will be found an interesting passage from a letter addressed to the
late famous actor, Lawrence Barratt. by John T. Doyle, in which we learn
that Spanish law permits the challenge of a proposed juris-consult-or master as we might designate him-"for consanguinity, affinity or favor." And
be it remembered that Katharine was of Spanish birth. I shall return td
this letter of Doyle; for the nonce it may be remarked that we cannot
affirm Shakespeare's knowledge of a nice point such as this; but the
recurrence of many such as to the law and other topics, creates a presumption that Shakespeare was accurate where accuracy seemed imperative, and
careless of matters irreevant to the subject in hand.
But clearly there are many legal references in Shakespeare which are
not referable merely to his sources, and which are only properly to be
understood by a happy combination of legal learning and antiquarian lore.
Sir George Greenwood contributes to our knowledge with just this happy
combination in his justification of Shakespeare's use of the term single bond
where Shylock says:
"Go with me to a notary, seal me then
Your single bond."
"Bonds have usually a condition annexed to them that on the person bound
paying so much money, or doing some specified act, the bond shall be void.
A bond without a condition is called a single bond." ("Encyclopedia of the
Laws of England," ii, 374, ed. i9o6.) It would seem then, at first blush, that
Shylock's bond was not a single bond, but one in which Antonio was bound
on failure to pay to suffer the loss of a pound of flesh to Shylock. Sir
George's explanation, however, is that this is not a condition upon the
performance of which the bond was to become void, but a penalty attached,
if he failed to pay. ("Shakespeare's Law," 25.) So, too, in the matter of
the king's guardianship in "Alls Well That Ends WelL" It will be remembered that in consequence of her cure of the king's illness, Helena, the daughter of a celebrated physician recently deceased, is granted the privilege of
choosing whom she will for a husband. She chooses the young Count of
Rousillon, by whose mother she had been reared and whom she had long
secretly loved; but the young scapegrace objects to a match on the basis
of such an inequality in rank. Whereupon the king replies:
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"Tis only title thou disdain'st in her, the which
1 can build up . .
If thou canst like this creature as a maid
I can create the rest: virtue and she
Is her own dower, honour and wealth from me.
...........
Take her by the hand,
And tell her she is thine: to whom I promise
A counterpoise: if not to thy estate,
A balance more replete."
Here on authority of the dictum of "Coke on Littleton" the "the lord could
not disparage the ward by a mesalliance," this passage has been pronounced
"bad law"; but the above words carefully read make clear the power of
the King, as the fountain of honor, "so to ennoble 'the spouse' as to makd
Helena 'of equal rank with his ward.'
Sir George's interesting commentary on a passage in "The Merry Wives of Windsor" in which occur thd
technical words: tarrant, witness, waste, fee simple, fine and recovery will
repay careful perusal, showing as it does a nice acquaintance with these
technicalities as in use in Shakespeare's day, howsoever they are placed
somewhat inappropriately in the mouth of Mistress Pige, one of the merry
wives of Windsor.
I should like, were there space, to comment on the quibbles of Portia
in the famous trial scene, on the absolute correctness of its proceedings as
they are presented in accordance with Latin, not English conditions. (On this
see especially Doyle's letter alluded to above.) And I should like, too, to
follow Sir George in his able exposition of how in "Measure for Measure,"
Shakespeare's sources and the Elizabethan law, making the taking of a
woman for a wife per verba dc prirsenti a legal marriage, explains the difficulties of the situation of Claudio and Juliet as of Angelo and Mariana in
that most serious and beautiful play; but I want to present this subject in an
aspect somewhat wider before I leave it.
Now it is not the lawyers alone who have been impressed with the
technical knowledge of Shakespeare. The physicians, the alienists, the nat-,
uralists, the student of history, the lover of the chase, even pedagogues, find
themselves amazed, each after his kind, at the quality of Shakespeare's specific knowledge in matters of detail. And the reason is not so far to seek.
In Bagshot's illuminating phrase, "Shakespeare's was an experiencing genius." What to the lawyer, the doctor, the pedagogue is a matter painfully
acquired by specific study, is to his intuitive genius the flash of a moment.
It is this in which largely his greatness, his comprehensiveness subsists. I
shall never weary of repeating that there is absolutely nothing mysterious
about Shakespeare except his genius, and'this I repeat because it is so necesthat we remember it. The inference that Shakespeare must have studied
law because he has fines and recoveries down pat, is just as rational as that
which makes him a falconer because tiercel gentle, jesses, haggard, eyas, and
the rest of the technical words of hawking are always correctly employed by
him. He has been made a schoolmaster because Page's son in "The Merry
Wives" can correctly decline hic, hac, hoc; though even-this will not make
him a Latinist.
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With every respect for the learning and argumentative acumen of Sir
George in this and his other able works, I submit that we cannot wrest
the secret of Shakespeare's greatness along the line of an investigation into
his expert or inexpert knowledge of any technical art.. This is the raiment
he wears, not the real man within; and his masks were many, howsoever the
essential man beneath remains ever the same, in his unmatchable grasp of
those larger things which cannot be weighed in scales and adjudicat.ed on
the basis of precedent.
I cannot make out whether under Sir George's definitions I am a lawyer
or not. I was once a student of the law, and admitted to the bar. I have
not practiced, and I have endeavored to get beyond the merely legal wa
of thinking about things. Has it ever occurred td some of our distinguished
members of the bar that history, science and philosophy would be impossible were their firocesses confined to the processes of the law; were their
proofs dependent on the limitations set for legal evidences? The existence
and foundation of courts of equity go to prove this repugnance for the
rigidities of conventional legal process: for there must be an appeal to
something wider than mere precedent. It is somewhat to be expected, then,
that we should find a large proportion of those who are visited by "historid
doubts" as to Shakespeare and others, who are troubled about "problems"
where no actual problems exist, should be lawyers or men of legal cast of
mind.
To such, the weighing of evidence is more interesting than the
exercise of the historic imagination; to such, trivialities bulk large and
obscure realities; and they theorize about matters the determination of which
is utterly unimportant to gods and to men.
I sometimes wonder if Shakespeare was after all so clever in these
small things as some of us would .think. ' It is said that he knows all about
a horse, and the chase, the falconry and the popular names and habits of
birds, insects and flowers; how could he help all this, country lad that he
was? Of sports, too, he was a master. As to human passions, conduct,
character, deportment-humanity was his subject matter, he studied it all
day and much of the night, and we must grant him an observer. Even in
this matter of the law, his father was litigious and his father's son after
him, as the discoveries of Professor Wallace. have gone further -to prove.
A clever man can learn almost as much in personal contact with the courts
as a duller youth in a law school. The difference between a specialist and
a genius is that the specialist is usually burdened with his learning; the
genius, with twice as much, is still lightly armed and at ease. Until we cease
applying the technical standards of our own liitleness to the stature of
greatness, we shall not understand men like Shakespeare. It is better to
read him than all these clever brochures about what he knew, what he was,
or who he was not, and this extends to comments like this of mine on their
cleverness. If the personal opinion of one who is not sure whether he is a
lawyer or not is of any moment in a case such as this, I should say that
Shakespeare's knowledge of the law, like his knowledge of everything else,
was that of a man who saw life directly, not life refracted through books;
it was accurate to an amazing degree where he had occasion to fix his
gaze; careless, where carelessness affected no damage to his art, and gen-
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crally far above that ordinary level of information which we demand of
other men. The accumulation of every scrap in his works that bas to do
with the law, technically or otherwise, and the weighing of it all with reference to his age, his sources, the lore back of it and the rest, would be a delightful piece of work, but it would bring us no nearer a verdict. There
is much in life, in art, in criticism that must ever remain in a state, pendente
lite.
Felix E. Sehe ling, Ph.D., Lift.D., LL.D.
Professor of History and English Literature,
I'niversity of Pennsylvania.
LE DaoIT INTERNATIONAL Pt.mLC POSITIF. Par. J. de Louter, Professeur
de Droit international public i rUniversit d' Utrecht. Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Oxford University Press,
6, vi, 50
New York City, 1920, 2 vols., pp. xi,
This is one of the publications of the Carnegie International Peace
Foundation. The author has occupied the chair of irternational law at the
University of Utrecht for more than twenty-five years and has written
much on international law and political science He has frequently served
as commissioner on administration of the Dutch East Indies. It was his work
Staaten Administratief Recht -,an Nederlandsch-Indi, published some
twenty years ago, that brought him favorable recognition among scholars in
this country. In igiO he published this work on international law at tha
Hague under the title of Het Stellig Volkcnrecht. He used the word "stellig" ("positive") to emphasize his doctrine that public international law is
"positive law," that is, distinctly outside the sphere of mere philosophy or
morals. At that time this had a special significance because Dr. Thomas
Baty, the distinguished English barrister, only the year before had published
his International Law, in which he had opposed a permanent international
court because it would be governed by merely "legal" principles. Dr. Baty
was answered not only by de Louter but also in France by Uon Bourgeois,
the wide-famed statesman, in his Pour la Soc[it' des Nations (i9io), embracing his speeches delivered at the First and Second Hague Conferences, urging acceptance of principles to constitute a recognized corpus of positive
public international law. It now belongs to history that the Second Hague
Peace Conference did go so far as to render obsolete most of the books on
the subject then extant.
In consequence of the erudition, clarity and modernity revealed in the
work of Professor de Louter, the Trustees of the Carnegie Foundation engaged him to prepare in French a new edition to form part of the International Law Series that the Foundation was then preparing for publication in
that language. The outbreak of the World War threatened to end the enterprise, but the Trustees prevailed upon the professor to continue his work,
with the understanding that he should limit his doctrinal exposition of the
subject to the period immediately before hostilities began. This, as he says
in the Preface, was "presenter une image fiddle du droit positif en vigueur
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au moment mime oii if devait subir une 6preuve fatale." In explaining
the apparent futility of now publishing a treatise of the law as it was up
to 1914 "mais bouleversE et i peu pros dtruit depuis lors" he expresses the
hope that he is presenting public international law such as it will be when
"il est pr~t i se relever pour recommencer une carri~re honorable et utile."
While some specialists will not agree with all the views of the author,
there is bound to be common accord that the work contains evidences of
painstaking and limitless research, impartial consideration of the divers
authorities in other lands and many languages and a just appreciation of
their weight. Few periods, and, indeed, still fewer countries, have escaped
the reach of his erudite mind and indefatigable energy.
For the United States, Kent's Commentaries are cited on the second
page and in the very first note, followed through the two volumes by
quotations from many other authoritative writers and distinguishcd statesmen, including Franklin, Webster, Sumner, Wheaton, Woolsey, Lieber,
Wharton, Choate, Root, and others not so well known-some being cited
many times. John Bassett Moore, our leading international jurist, recently
selected as one of the judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice, is frequently quoted with marked approval.
A most valuable feature of the work is this great mass of supporting
authorities, constituting firm and indestructible pillars for the whole work,textually and exegetically. The logical order, the cogent reasoning, the interesting anecdotal and historical references employed to elucidate the various
propositions advahced in clear and cultured modern French will strongly appeal to serious readers, whether lawyers or laymen. The author seeks no
model for his plan of treatment. There are but three divisions of the work:
The first is the Introduction, comparing various definitions and marking the
traditional eras-Prior to 1648, From 1648 to x815, and From 1815 to 1914.
The next is Droit nmti~riel, embracing subjects and objects of international
law and basic treaties, and the third is Droit formel, comprising the organs
or instrumentalities of international affairs, conflicting interests, war and neutrality.
It is in the Introduction that the author reveals his special doctrinal
views upon the "positive" basis of public international law. He makes a delightfully logical distinction between "origin" and "source" and signals the
confusion that has at times arisen from treating them as synonymous. "La
mitaphore est emprunt& A la naissafice des fleuves et rappeile aussit6t qu'on ne parle pas ici de la viritable orgine de l'eau, que reste cacbe
dans It sein de la terre, mais simplement de l'endroit oit elle vient i I&
lumiire qui en baigne la surface" (I, 42). He gives notice that he will not
deal with law in the meaning of origin, but only "source," as indicating "sa
forme perceptible, ofi le droit international se manifeste." Few writers have
equalled the attractive nanner in which the author has presented the phases
of the relation of international law and other sciences and the historical de-.
velopment of the subject. Where he admits lack of unanimity of opinion
he presents the conflicting authorities fairly and dispassionately. He stands
for the doctrine: "L'arbitrage n'est applicable qu'aux conflits juridiques"
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I91, i91) and devotes many pages to outlining the formative steps for an
international tribunal along the lines considered at the Second Hague Con-

ference.
It is gratifying to know that many of his ideas correspond with those
which last year Mr. Root successfully urged before the Committee invited by the Council of the League of Xations to prepare a plan for the Permanent Court of International Justice, the judges of which have but lately
been elected.
Among the particularly interesting sections are those covering "Les
Conflits" (II, Secs. 37-4), under which the history of peace efforts is
narrated. Here the author shows an extraordinary familiarity with legal
literature in this country by citing the two works of Thomas Willing Balch,
the scholarly Philadelphia lawyer-author, on Emeric Cruel, the great French
advocate of arbitration of the seventeenth century, and the translation of his
little work called Le nouvcau Cyin: (II, 113). Not many, even in America,
know of these two privately printed and highly prized books. It is not surprising, therefore, to also find a thorough consideration of peace efforts
in this country, including the founding of the still active American Peace
Socicty in 828 as an enlargement of similar societies in three states in t8S,
founded by David Dodge and Xoah Worcester, and references to the
pamphlet of William Ladd, published in 1840, proposing a conference of
delegates from all civilized nations to fix international law by treaty and
assure peace by the creation of an international court of justice (II, 114).
It is a striking coincidence that the man who then vainly urged these ideas in
Europe and the man who successfully urged them in 1920 had the same given
name--Elihu Burritt and Elihu Root.
The author is not of those who believe war can be abolished, but he
quotes with approval Parieu, the great French pacifist: "La paix iternelle est
impracticable mais ind6finiment approximable" (II, 22o). As to the steps
in that direction,- particularly by restriction of armaments, now so apropos,
the reader will nowhere find a more interesting and learned historical review, including every shade ot opinion the various governments and publicists
have entertained (II, io9---6). The reason for the failure of the Second
Peace Conference on the armament question is simply put: "Une musuelle
nzfiance empicha toute entente des puissances europiennes quant a la restriction 6ventuelle de leurs forces navales" (II, 323). Attention is called, however, to the treaty between Argentina and Chili in i:ow, renouncing naval
construction then in progress, agreeing to diminish their squadrons and declaring a naval holiday for five years. This led to the erection of the
peace monument on the mountainous boundry line between the two countries known as "The Christ of the Andes."
The author evidently found it difficult to confine his work to the status
of international law in 1914, for in many instances he has referred to the
Great War. As to neutral territory being crossed by belligerent troops,
he says in a note: "En 1914, les armies allemandes traversirent la Belgique
malgr6 ses protestations, malgri sa ncutraiWg pcrmacnt ct garantie" (II,
423). Under the heads relating to submarine and aerial war engines, he has
also d-'emed it permissible to utilize data of the late conflict.
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No reader of this work can fail to be impressed by its many high qualities, but he will experience some chagrin and be put to unnecessary trouble
by the lack of index, list of authorities, explanation of abbreviations and
adequate table of contents. There are also a few mistakes in the names
of authors cited and occasional errors in spelling. As illustrations-"Sumner"
is cited as "Summer," "Willing" is given as "William," and "impraticable" is
These features are regrettable in so valuable a
spelled "impracticable."
work, and somewhat surprising in view of the manifest expense of production and the typographical reputation of the Oxford University Press. The
need of index and list of authorities is really great enough to warrant publishing them as an addendum, which it is hoped will be done.

William IV. Smithers.

Philadelphia, Pa.
THE AmiEiCAx PILOSOPHiY OF GOVERNMENT. Essays by Alpheus Henry
Snow. G. P..Putnam's Sons, The. Knickerbocker Press, New York City,
1921, pp. 111, 485.
This volume, which is made up of a number of essays published by the
author from time to time during the period extending from i9o6 to i919,
takes its title from an essay reprinted from The American Journal of International Law for April, 1914, and now given the first place in this collection.
But the author's theory of this so-called "American Philosophy" permeates
all the essays and constitutes the fundamental basis for the conclusions reached.
This theory regards our system as finding its most definite statement in
the Declaration of Independence, and as intended to safeguard primarily the
rights of the individual. "To secure these rights governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
These governments are therefore in the nature of the agents of the governed, and their authority is properly circumscribed and limited by the underlying consent, and may not be construed as extending to unjust ends:
the courts constitute the natural and safest machinery for establishing these
limitations, and this explains their power in the American system to invalidate legislation which exceeds the authority of the Government, the people's

agent
In these principles the author finds a basis for the delimitation of the
country's colonial power-that it may be exercised in the nature of leadership
for the benefit of our possessions, but not in an imperial fashion for our
own advantage.
He also derives important conclusions with respect to international relations, contending that the fundamental purposes and ideals of our institutions
cannot be preserved by federation with other states established upon a different underlying theory, especially if to such federation is given compulsive
power. Rather, it is contended, is it to be desired that the international
relations should be conducted under a looser association functioning preferably by way of conciliation instead of by way of arbitration or judicial
determination, and exercising such authority as it exerts by a process which
the author calls "Judicative Conciliation." By this term he describes ad-
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vice to states involved in a controversy based upon a thorough inquiry by
another state, or by other states, conducted in judicial fashion.
Throughout the essays runs the same thought that, in the long run
co-operation without the compulsive feature will produce a nearer approximation to a solution of the international problem than the closer union of a
league. Thus with singularly apt description of the choice which seems to
confront the world the author says in an essay reprinted from The World
Court Magaine, of April, i918:
"After the present great war -s ended, a time is certain to arrive for
considering the problem of international reorganization and reconstruction.
The question will be, whether to maintain and perfect the existing co-operative union of the nations, or to change it into a universal federal state or into.
a universal confederation or league of nations. The first of these courses
seems most expedient. This would necessitate a gradual development of
the existing co-operative union by a long series of international conferences,
each endeavoring to remove obstacles to international co-operation and t
provide more and more effective organs and processes for directing the nations towards the observance of the co-operative principle. Through such a
continuous development, co-operative union of the nations might be found
adequate to produce the nearest approximation to international justice, order
and peace of which the human race is capable."
In dealing with the power of the courts to invalidate unconstitutional
legislation, the contention is advanced that the due process claiise has been
pressed far beyond its intended scope and should be restricted to "a taking
away on account of wrong-doing," a contention novel more by way of positive suggestion than-by way of negative criticism. There is, of course, full
recognition that this point of view is of academic interest only, in view of the
decisions; and the tendency of these- decisions away from the safeguarding
of contractual and property rights to a greater concern for the social interests of the individual and the community is helpfully discussed.
In addition to the essays which deal primarily with the author's analysis
of his theory of the "American Philosophy of Government" and with the
conclusions he derives the'reform in relation to the problems of dependencies
and international relations, the book includes essays on Shantung, the German Colonies and the Mandatory System, as well as essays on the Law of
Nations, the Proposed Codification of International Law, and the Alien in
Hnry Wolf Bikl&.
the Community.
Law School,
Unhicrsiki of Pennsylvania.
THE LAw OF THE SEA. A Manual of the Principles of Admiralty Law
for Students, Mariners and Ship Operators. -By George L Canfield and
George IV. Dazell. With a Summary of the Navigation Laws of the
United States by Jasper Yeates Brinton. D. Appleton & Co., New York City,
1921, pp. x'n, 315.
Appleton's new publication in its "Shipping Series," the -Law of the
Sea has been in the hands of the public for a sufficient length of time to
justify an appraisement of its value as the manual it-professes to be.
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The editors of the series, Emory R. Johnson, whose labors in transportation and shipping questions have taken such wide scope, and Ray S. MacElwee, whose great success in dealing with the adjuncts of transportation
and shipping, are to be congratulated in receiving from the hands of
Messrs. Canfield and Dalzell such a worthy addition to the series.
The book attempts to treat briefly all phases of the law as applied to a
ship, from its keel laying to its final end, including the responsibilities of
the contractor and future owner in the building of a ship until its launching, and all of the legal incidents, resulting from the operation of the ship,
either by corporate owners, or owners of shares, and their various relations with master, crew, cargo, freight, charterers and underwriters.
The legal results of employment of a ship, arising not only out of contract, but out of tort, and those situations and legal consequences which flow
from the ancient doctrine involved in General Average and Salvage are covered in more or less- detail.
The prototype of the book is to be found in its English forerunner,
Maritime Law, published in England by Mr. Albert Saunders, whose treatment of the same subject is perhaps more adapted to the needs of the student or layman than the method employed by the authors of The Law of
the Sea.
Mr. Saunders employs a narrative form and tells the story of a ship
from a contract with the builder until it becomes a wreck. The narrative
takes the ship from the initial contract of the builder and follows its launching, through the formalities of mortgage and registration, to the point where
it is loaded and has begun its adventure, meets with a collision, or encounters
other perils of the sea, where all the possible contingencies, in their legal
aspects, are discussed, either from the standpoint of owner, charterer, shipper, consignee, master or crew, or third person. Nine voyages are related
in narrative form, affording an opportunity'for the discussion of voyage
charters, "tine charters, bottomry bonds, general average, maritime liens,
and all of the varied and difficult situations, with which a ship and its master and owners have to deal in the course of maritime business. Following this narrative, the reader not only has the benefit of a clear appreciation
of the methods by which complicated questions arise, but is able to follow
the solution of the questions through the different rules and remedies afforded by the maritime law.
It would seem that this method is perhaps a better one for the layman
and student without other guide than the arrangement chosen by the authors
of The Law of the Sea-an arrangement that relegates the question of
remedies to the last chapter in the book, where they are treated en masse,
without reference to the other portions of the book The book is somewhat of a step forward, however, in American publications touching the
subject, and it is to be hoped that it will be followed by a more exhaustive treatise, invoking the method used by Mr. Saunders with such notable success.
America has too few authorative books on shipping and its allied subjects. The student, or the active practitioner, finds it necessary to rely for
exhaustive treatment upon the English standard authorities: Lowndes on
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General Average; Marsden on Collisions at Sea: Carver on Carriage of
Goods by Sea; Maclachlan's .Merchant Shipping-to name only a few of the
standard English works-all of which should be replaced in America by
books of equal standing, devoted to a discussion of the law in America,
which differs in so many essentials from that of England, and is now only
to be found in the Supreme Court and Federal reports, or in the early
State reports, where, before the founding of the present judicial system, so
many important commercial questions found their solution.
It is not desired to be over-critical, but when a book is designed for
students "without guidance" and put forth "with the expectation that (it)
will be used as a class text book," inaccuracies should be noted.
The first chapter states that there are several district courts in each
state-whereas in twenty-two states of the Union there is only one district.
and hence only one district court.
The definition given of a contract, as being maritime "when it refates
to the ship as an instrument of commerce and navigation" might well mislead the student "without guidance." A more accurate definition would be
that a maritime contract is one touching rights and duties appertaining to
commerce and navigation.
"Damaged cargo" is given as an example of a tort, whereas in fact, in
most actions, recovery founded on damage to cargo is based on contract.
"Limitation of Liability" is treated as a doctrine which developed out of
the necessities of the case, and no thought is given to the fact that considerations of public policy led to the enactment of statutory exemptions, differing in different countries, but all forming the basis of the limitations of
liability enforced in the Admiralty Courts of various jurisdictions with
varying incidents and results.
In treating of General Average, the authors e~xpress surprise at the failure of other courts of law to adopt the principles, and this in view of the
fact that there is a strong tendency at present to dispose of the doctrine of
General Average as being extremely cumbersome, and expensive and dilatory
in practice.
Some inconsistencies appear, even in the first chapter. For instance, in
the discussion of maritime law generally, in one paragraph the law is
stated as being -less susceptible of statutory modification than the common
law," and the effect of careless legislation with its necessary local effect, and
its tendency to divert business into other channels is decried, -and yret in
the following paragraphs it is stated that our maritime laws must be restated and reformed.
Although the Index is a good one, unrelated matter is often found under
the wrong paragraph heading; for instance, a paragraph dealing with "Enrollment" or "Registration" treats of the law regarding the citizenship of
pilots and officers.
On the whole, the book supplies a need and will be found most useful
to those who desire to secure a comprehensive grasp of the subject of which
it treats. The book may not rank as high authority.but it is to be hoped that
it will be the precursor of others which will.
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A word should be said for the appendix, containing as it does an admirable "Summary of the Navigation Laws of the United States." It is
the only summary of the kind so- far published, and one which should be of
great aid to those who have to deal with a subject.which is in so much
confusion, owing to the form of its growth through the many revisions and
re-enactments of Congress.

William J. Conlen.
Philadelphia, Pa.
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND TlE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW. By John
Eugene Harley, Assistant Professor of Political Science in the University of
Southern California. 'ith an Introduction by Theodore Marburg. Oxford
University Press, New York City, 19m, pp. ix, 127.

In this little book Professor Harley has attempted to set out, as he
expresses it, the effect of the League of Nations on International Law. It
would be more accurate to say the effect of the operation of the League of
Nations on International Law. The League itself can have no effect at all;
it must function as an organization before it can make any impression. This
may sound hypercritical, but it is just the criticism which may be leveled at
current international legal writings. They are wanting in accuracy and logical precision. The learned professor has therefore been led into the obvious
error of over-estimating the potency and effectiveness of the League and
ignoring the practical question of whether it does or will survive as an effective agency in international life.
The conclusions of the book are well summarized in Chapter XI, somewhat as follows: The defects in International Law prior to the adoption of
the League of Nations were: (i) Lack of agreement as to correct conception of International Law; (2) Inadequate methods of developing International Law; (3) Unwillingness of the nations of the world to join together
in giving effect to the law and providing sanctions to uphold it; "(4) Inadequate machinery for administering international law and settling disputes
between nations; (5) Doubt v'hether the theory of international law formulated in the seventeenth century was adequate for the world of i9o. The
learned author concludes that the Covenant of the League of Nations cured
these defects, upon which we may observe: (i) It is impossible to see how
the Covenant can or will reconcile the fundamental theories of International
Law which are matters of individual opinion and can only be resolved by
argument, analysis and reasoning, if they can ever be resolved at all. To give
the Covenant such an effect would outdo German control of thought in its
palmiest days. (2) The statement that the Covenant removes the remaining
defects is simply saying that because the Covenant has been entered into therefore the League does and will have sufficient power to control international
conduct, an assumption entirely unwarranted by any facts existing in the
world today.
It is difficult to understand what the professor means by the "new"
internatioinal law. International law as a system, science and inquiry into
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international conduct is centuries old. and the change in a few rules would not
warrant us in speaking of a new international law.
We find all the conventional forms of the international law writers observed. We are informed on the first page that Grotius is well called the
father of international law, statement which seems essential to the completeness of any treatise on this subject. We also find the usual appendix
comprising about one-half of the work, and containing reprints of documents already accessible elsewhere. This habit of reprinting undoubtedly
reduces the labor of the author but seems to be -of no other use.
The book is an enthusiastic expression of -the impractical and visionary,
although highly ideal, in international relations. War is one of the vices of
mankind and cannot be expected to cease until the underlying causes of war,
to wit. ignorance, selfishness, international rivalries and the like, have been
removed. To accomplish this will require an' education of the common
people of the world extending probably over centuries. To say that it has
been accomplished by a writing on a few pieces of paper is to fly in the
face of reason and all human experience.
Roland R. Foalke.
Philadelphia, Pa.
cIAL LA.w CAsFs. By Harold L Perrin, Professor and Head of
Co
the Department- of Law of the College of Business Administration, Boston
University; and Hugh W. Babb, Assistant Professor of Law at the College
of Business Administration, Boston University. George H. Doran Company,
New York City, 1921, 2 vols., PP. xxi, 536, xv, 414.
Another case book. Intended by the authors to cover two years' work in
Commercial Law, it might very well serve for a three years' course. In
fact, it is most unlikely that it could be handled by most colleges in fewer
than three years. From a student's point of view, a book that promises such
long usage has much in its favor. The cost of law books is always a
hardship; hence, the outlay of only $7.5o at the beginning of a siudent's
course for a book to be used during two or three years is an important asset
of this new publication, one that should recommend it to the teaching staff,
other things being equal. Moreover, it is noteworthy from .an academic
standpoint in its presentation of a whole business law course within the
cover of a single book. A single-book presentation of business law awakens
in the student a sense of the unity and continuity of the subject as can never
be done by a series of case books on specific subdivisions.
This kind of treatment of legal Subjects for non-legal students is
greatly needed. The law is approached too technically and too specifically
in most business schools of collegiate grade. I take it that the purpose
of law in these schools is not primarily to give the students the discipline
afforded by legal training, any more than it is to make lawyers of them. A
business law course in a business school should have two aims; to give the
student such a general kn6wledge of the law as he has of history or of
economics: and, secondly to give him such definite, practical information as
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will enable him to conduct his business legally, and so to avoid the pitfalls
of the law. The very fact that the authors of Commercll Law Cases have
brought a whole business law course under a single cover seems to be a
recognition on their part of the.needs of our business schools.
It is not surprising that closer investigation of their book results in disappointment. It would be no easy matter to reduce a course to such a minimum of pages with entire success. A minor defect, perhaps, but one that
has a psychological effect, is the physical appearance of the boGk As one
goes from page to page, one is overwhelmed with the details-headings innumerable in black type that are not the main subjects at all, but are subsubjects, and far more conspicuous as to type than the larger headings under
which they belong. Students working for the first time in law and using
this book would think of the subject as just so many disconnected segments, hundreds of them, in black type, through these two volumes.
This disjointed effect is seriously aggravated in another way. The book
coatains both text and case, but neither one is structurally related to the
other. If this is only a case book, then I suggest that the so-called text go.
It takes up space that might be given to other cases or that could be eliminated altogether to reduce the size of each volume. The only justification
for explanatory matter would be to correlate subjects and parts of subjects,
and that it fails to io adequately. Its presence is detrimental to the unified effect which the authors have no doubt tried to produce. It seems to
be merely an insert that brings the student to a halt when he wishes to push
on.
As an inclusive, compact case book. Commercial Law Cases, it is commendable. Its cases are carefully selected and they cover the subjects. College students might well substitute the one book for their more numerous
case books. But the text is not full enough or valuable enough to take the
place of lectures, outlines, class-notes or another text. The student could
use it simply as a condensed, well-arranged case book. For the business man
who has not had college training in commercial law, the book has even less
value. The text is not full enough, and the court decisions are, for the most
part, too long. Both for the student and the layman a summary of the
court decision. emphasizing the point of law involved, should be included. I
wish the authors might see fit to change this into a narrative which brings in
the cases as an integral part of the story, a book of distinct scholarship and
collegiate grade. What is needed is a law book that is interesting; that is
historic in treatment; and that will recognize the needs not of the lawyer but
of the business man. Professors Perrin and Babb have made a good start
in publishing so comprehensive a case book A comprehensive text and
case-book in one is the present need.
Wendell Phillips Raine.
Assistant Professor of Business Law,
IWharton School of Finance and Commerce,
University of Pennsylvania.

